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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law
of Louisiana-Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns
In accord with a trend throughout the country' the Louisiana
legislature in 1950 enacted a "deferred posfing" statute2 similar
to that recommended by the American Bankers Association. 8 In
this Comment inquiry will be made into the reasons for the en-
actment of this legislation, the results it has had on Louisiana
law and banking practices, and the changes which would be ef-
fected in the law on this subject should the Uniform Commercial
Code be adopted.
Past and Present Banking Operations
Prior to the enactment of the present statute the process of
collection and posting of items was usually completed by two
or three o'clock in the afternoon on the day the items were re-
ceived by the payer bank for the reason that any return had to be
made on the same day that the check was received. 4 This prac-
tice often caused difficulty. Because the banks made an effort
to process items as they were collected, time schedules were
.often tight; there were excessive machine requirements, repeti-
tious handling of statements, and an unevenly distributed work
load during the day.5 With haste necessary, error was a likely
occurrence.6
As a result of World War II and its attendant shortage of
personnel, the present practice of deferred posting and delayed
returns came into being.7 Under the new procedure, both the
determination of whether to honor or dishonor an item and the
1. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS - COLLECTION § 27, p. 14 (Supp. 1954)
states that "forty-seven states, Alaska and the District of Columbia now have
legislation permitting the practice of deferred posting in some form and under
some circumstances." Kentucky appears to be the only state without a statute.
For citations to the various statutes see id. at 1-14, § 27.
2. La. Acts 1950, No. 144, p. 310, now LA. R.S. 6:67, 6:68 (1950).
3. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS - COLLECTION § 27, at p. 3 (Supp.
1954).
4. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns -The Current Check Collec-
tion Problem, 62 HARV. L. REv. 905, 916 (1949).
5. Lawson, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns, 41 BANKING 56 (Jan.
1949).
6. Leary, Deferred Posting and'Delayed Returns-The Current Check Collec-
tion Problem, 62 HAuV. L. REV. 905, 916 (1949).
7. Id. at 906.
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process of posting can be delayed until the day after receipt of
the item. This is because credit given before midnight of the
day of deposit, other than for immediate payment over the
counter, does not become final until midnight of the day after the
check is received by the bank. While the bookkeepers are
processing the items which had been handled by the proof de-
partment on the previous day, the proof department is proving
the current day's items. Bookkeeping entries are posted as of
the previous day." The advantages of this practice to banks are
numerous, the most important being simplicity of operation,
elimination of standby forces, and the necessity of handling a
customer's card only once.9 The practice of deferred posting
apparently has promoted banking efficiency10 and does not seem
to have caused adverse comment from bank customers."'
Deferred Posting and the Collection Process
The present deferred posting statute is applicable to "de-
mand item[s] payable by, at or through" a bank. Payment
made over the counter is considered final payment. In the case
of payment other than that over the counter, a bank must have
given credit for the item before midnight of the day of receipt
in order to delay revocation of credit until the day after receipt.
Credit is defined in the statute as "payment, remittance, advice
of credit, or authorization to charge and, in cases where the
item is received for deposit as well as for payment, also includes
the passing of appropriate entries to the receiving bank's gen-
eral ledger without regard to whether the item is posted to in-
dividual customers' ledgers." Apparently the item itself may
be returned to constitute revocation, or "if the item is held for
protest or at the time is lost or is not in the possession of the
bank," written notice of dishonor, nonpayment or revocation
may be given. The item "shall be deemed dishonored on the day
& Lawson, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns, 41 BANKING 56 (Jan.
1949).
9. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returts - The Current Check Col-
lection Problem, 62 HABv. L. REv. 905, 917 (1949). In Lawson, Clearing the Way
for Deferred Posting, 32 Buaaouuns CLEARING HousE 24 (June 1948) a number
of advantageous results of using the system are listed. Thus, at the beginning of
the day the entire day's work is ready for the bookkeepers and sporadic posting is
thereby eliminated. The ledgers reflect the true business condition of the day's
business. Work pressure is relieved and staff morale shows improvement. The
work is more orderly, and the consequent greater operating efficiency saves time
and money.
10. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 961, 970 (1950).
11. Lawson, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns, 41 BANKING 56 (Jan.
(1949).
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the item or notice is dispatched." The statute further provides
that if a bank receives an item on a day other than its regular
business day, or after business hours, or during periods of
limited business operations, it may consider the day of receipt
as being its next regular business day. The statute concludes
with the statement that "each branch or office of a bank shall
be deemed a separate bank."' 2
When the statute was adopted in Louisiana, it was predicted
that "an undesirable degree of uncertainty may be introduced
into some commercial transactions."' s Although there has ap-
parently been no litigation in this state reaching the appellate
court level which deals with situations arising from the applica-
tion of the deferred posting statute, some uncertainty does exist.
It will be pertinent to consider the ways in which the statute
has caused uncertainty in the collection process and the problems
to which deferred posting could give rise.
Deferred posting plays an integral part in the collection
process and in the problem of payment. The collection process' 4
and the payment problem 15 both turn heavily on the question of
who shall bear risk of loss. When the drawer's account is finally
charged and the check is cancelled by the drawee bank, the
drawer and endorsers are released from liability and the check
is considered paid.' 6 This payment or credit is normally con-
sidered final because the bank may, with diligence, discover
facts which might stop payment of the check.17 When, however,
12. LA. R.S. 6:67-68 (1950).
13. Louisiana Legislation of 1950, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 27 (1051).
14. Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 TUL. L. REV. 537, 554 (1936)
refers to the collection process as a "delightful muddle."
15. STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER 517 (1954)
noted that the payment problem is "plainly a complicated one."
16. City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 271 U.S. 489 (1926)
Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160 (1924) ; Joffrion-Woods, Inc. v.
Brock, 180 La. 771, 157 So. 589 (1934) (where drawer of a check had on deposit
sufficient funds to meet check when presented by collecting bank, check was "paid"
when drawee debited drawer's account with the amount of the check, stamped the
check "paid" and forwarded its draft to the collecting bank for the amount of the
check); cf. Ray v. Canal Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 547, 173 So. 101 (1937)
(where merely stamping the check with rubber stamp did not constitute payment)
Langridge v. Dauenhauer, 120 La. 450, 45 So. 387 (1908) (where the court noted
that it is the payment of the check and not its receipt which operates to discharge
the obligation of the drawer) ; Hunt v. Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 362, 179 Pac.
248 (1919) ; but cf. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Mass. 49,
67 N.E. 670 (1903).
See LA. R.S. 7:87, 7:88 (1950). Section 87 of the NIL defines an instrument
payable at a bank as an order on that bank to pay, and section 88 construes the
term "payment in due course."
17. Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N.Y. 735 (1871), is the leading authority
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the holder deposits the check in a bank other than the drawee
bank, the credit is usually not final and he may not draw against
ita until the check has been processed, usually through a clear-
ing house, and the drawee bank has credited the collecting bank
with the amount of the check. 19 Until this time the holder tech-
nically may not use the fund and is subject to several risks:
payment may be stopped,20 failure of the bank may preclude
collection, 2' the funds may be garnisheed,2 2 or the drawer may
die before payment.28 Legislation permitting deferred posting
and delayed returns, by allowing the bank an additional twenty-
four hour period in which to revoke the credit, allows more time
for the contingencies above noted to occur. Mere dispatch of a
dishonor notice during this period, under certain circumstances,
will meet the requirements of the statute; therefore, an item
may be honored by payment or remittance through clearing
house channels, and then a revocation, though given within the
prescribed period, may. not arrive at the drawee bank until sev-
for this proposition. There the court remarked, id. at 742, that "the bank always
has the means of knowing the state of the account of the drawer, and if it elects
to pay the paper, it voluntarily takes upon itself the risk of securing it out of
the drawer's account or otherwise." See cases in Annot., 87 A.L.R. 442 (1933).
NIL § 189, LA. R.S. 7:189 (1950), provides that "a check of itself does not
operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with
the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless or until it certifies the
check." One Louisiana case, no longer followed, held that it was conditional and
not final payment. Lake Charles Feed Co. v. Sabatier, 14 La. App. 233, 125 So.
318 (1929), affd, 14 La. App. 233, 129 So. 261 (1930). Steffen, The Check Col-
lection Muddle, 10 TUL. L. REv. 537, 542, n. 25 (1936), notes that whether consid-
ered paid or not, secondary parties may still be discharged by the delay.
18. Moore, Sussman & Corstvet, Drawing Against Uncollected Checks: I, 45
YALE L.J. 1, 16-21 (1936).
19. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 961, 962 (1950), and authorities cited. An excellent
discussion of clearinghouse procedure may be found in Leary, Deferred Posting
and Delayed Returns- The Current Check Collection Problem, 62 HARiV. L. REv.
905, 910-15 (1949).
20. Louisiana Ice Co. v. State National Bank, 1 McGloin 181 (La. App. 1881).
Although the thrust of the decision, that the bank is normally agent rather than
debtor of the depositor, is no longer sound law after the case of In re Liquidation
of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609 (1935), its holding that the
drawer has power to stop payment of the check apparently remains good law, and
in accord with the majority view stated in Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S..
385 (1888) and Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y.
Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Since under NIL §189, LA. R.S. 7:189 (1950), the
check does not constitute assignment, further reason exists why stop payment
orders should be permitted.
21. Upon failure of a bank the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation pro-
tects only those holders which the drawee bank is obligated to pay, the obligation
arising from either acceptance by the bank or by a final crediting of the check
to the correspondent bank. 12 C.F.R. § 330.1, 330.2 (1949).
22. Cases are collected in Annots., 50 A.L.R. 403 (1927), 84 A.L.R. 412 (1933).
23. Bridewell v. Clay, 185 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (where bank's
authority to pay was considered revoked by the death of the drawer).
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eral days later.24 The problem of risk of loss during this period
seems of paramount importance.25 The risk problem is two-
fold: on the one hand encompassing those risks to which the
bank is liable for engaging in the practice of deferred posting,
and on the other including those risks which shift the loss from
drawer to payee. 26
Risks of the banks. Banks encounter several risks in the col-
lection process. One of these is the possible liability of the payer
bank that retains a bad item longer than the prescribed time.
Ordinarily a bank becomes liable for the payment of an item by
what may be termed a formal acceptance. 27 But, by retaining an
item for a period exceeding that legally allowed and refusing to
return it either accepted or dishonored, the bank may be held
to have accepted by retention and hence become liable for the
payment of the item. 28 It is, therefore, necessary to determine
when the period of legal delay can be said to expire and ac-
ceptance by retention shifts the risk of loss to the payer bank.
The NIL provides that the period shall be twenty-four hours
after delivery of the item to the drawee, or within such period
'as the holder may allow. 29 Under Louisiana deferred posting
rules, the bank has twenty-four hours from midnight of the day
24. Fear of the uncertainty this could cause was expressed in Louisiana Legis-
lation of 1950, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 27 (1951).
25. But see Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 TUL. L. REV. 537, 554
(1936). Id. at 555-56, the notion is offered that some form of insurance, similar
to Federal Deposit Insurance, should be provided to cover bank collection losses.
26. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns - The Current Check Col-
lection Problem, 62 HARv. L. REV. 905, 917 (1949). The risks caused by deferred
posting to be disussed in this Comment are as suggested by Leary.
27. LA. R.S. 7:132 (1950).
28. LA. R.S. 7:137 (1950) provides that "where a drawee to whom a bill is
delivered for acceptance destroys the same, or refuses within twenty-four hours
after such delivery, or within such other period as the holder may allow, to return
the bill accepted or non-accepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have ac-
cepted the same." See Schutte v. Citizens Bank, 3 La. App. 547 (1926) (dictum),
which follows the acceptance by retention rule of the leading case of Wisner v.
First National Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 Atl. 955 (1908).
Before deferred posting drawee banks were required to give final credit to
correspondent banks on the day of receipt. See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 961, 964 (1950)
and authorities cited. Payment was deemed final when the deadline, traditionally
at three o'clock in the afternoon, had passed. Hallenback, Receiver v. Leinert,
Receiver, 295 U.S. 116 (1935). If subsequently forgery or an overdraft was dis-
covered, the loss remained with the drawee bank and no charge back could be made.
Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333 (1825).
This problem involves the ramifications of the rule advanced in Price v. Neal, 3
Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762), discussed in Comment, The Effect of
the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on the Negotiable In-
strument8 Law of Louisiana - The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 16 LOuISIANA LAW
Ravi w 128 (1955) ; Comment, 43 ILL. L. REV. 823 (1949).
29. LA. R.S. 7:136-137 (1950).
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the item was delivered to it to return the dishonored item or
dispatch notice of dishonor.- In the event that a bank should
hold the item more than twenty-four hours after delivery, the
question arises whether or not it would be held to have accepted,
even though notice of dishonor might have been sent to the bank
of collection within the twenty-four hour period after the mid-
night allowable under the deferred posting rules. To give effect
to the deferred posting statute the bank should not be so held. o
Another risk to which banks might be subjected concerns
the right of the collecting bank to charge back the credit ex-
tended to its depositor for the item. The collecting bank would
30. While there are no Louisiana cases involving the timeliness of acceptance,
a case in point has been decided in Texas. City State Bank v. National Bank of
Commerce, 261 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). Early one morning plaintiff
bank received several checks, drawn on it, and forwarded to it by defendant bank
for payment. The same afternoon, well within the twenty-four hour period allow-
able for rejection under the Texas deferred posting statute, plaintiff sent defend-
ant a telegram stating that it was returning the checks protested. Not until the
following afternoon, after the expiration of the twenty-four hour period, did plain-
tiff actually post the protested checks in the mail. Because the Texas statute,
TEx. REv. STAT. arts. 342-704 (Vernon 1947), requries that items, if received
through the mail, be returned within twenty-four hours of receipt to constitute
dishonor, the court held that the payment made by plaintiff bank was irrevocable.
The court noted that had the checks been presented over the counter for payment
in cash or for deposit in a drawee bank, that mere notice of protest would have
been valid. Id. art. 342-704(1). Would the result have been the same in Louisi-
ana? Probably not, because the Louisiana statute requires only that the items
be posted before midnight of the day after presentment, which was done here. The
Louisiana statute is similar to the Texas statute in that the item itself seem-
ingly must be returned within the time allowable. Only if the item is held for
protest or is lost or not in possession of the bank will mere notice suffice. LA.
R.S. 7:67 (1950). "
The Louisiana statute provides, as does the Texas legislation, that the effect
of the statute may be varied by agreement, thus permitting an extension of the
delay period by agreement of the parties. Although no litigation has been brought
before Louisiana courts on the propriety of agreements, two cases have arisen in
other jurisdictions. In a California case the court held a notice sufficient because,
although a day late by deferred posting rules, the parties were found to have
agreed to an extension of time. Larrus v. First Nat. Bank of San Mateo County,
266 P.2d 143 (Calif. App. 1954). See Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings
Ass'n v. Merchandise Nat. Bank, 201 F.2d 68, 73, n. 18 (9th Cir. 1953) (where
the court merely noted that the parties had followed the practice of "delayed
posting"). In a Texas case the court refused to consider an acceptance condi-
tional and it was held irrevocable because the bank had agreed with the depositor
to accept the items under special deposit terms. City State Bank v. Wichita Nat.
Bank, 253 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; cf. Investors Syndicate v. Deposit
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 172 So. 39 (La. App. 1937).
A similar question arose in another California case, Hansen v. Bank of Ameri-
can Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 225 P.2d 665 (Calif. App. 1950), as to the purpose
of the additional time granted for giving notice under deferred posting legisla-
tion. There the plaintiff contended that the notice of dishonor given was not
punctual because the deferred posting statute did not purport to give a bank
another day in which to determine whether the check was good or bad, but gave
the additional time only. for giving notice when the check was found not good.
The court held that the notice was timely dispatched and denied recovery.
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probably not be willing to grant the additional time permitted
under deferred posting rules to a payer bank unless some satis-
factory charge-back agreement is reached."' In Louisiana a
creditor-debtor relationship is deemed to exist between the bank
and its depositor in the absence of agreement otherwise.8 2 The
Louisiana court, therefore, would probably permit the collecting
bank to recover against its customer solely on his liability as
endorser and then only if notice of dishonor were properly
given. 8
Banks also encounter risk in determining whether or not the
notice of dishonor required under deferred posting rules has
been timely given under the NIL. Section 104(1) of the NIL
provides that when the person giving and the person receiving
notice live in different towns, the notice must be "deposited in
the postoffice in time to go by mail the day following the day of
dishonor, or if there be no mail at a convenient hour on that day,
by the next mail thereafter. '8 4 Since under deferred posting
practices dishonor could date from midnight of the day follow-
ing receipt, the question arises whether the phrase "no mail at a
convenient hour" includes delay caused by the use of deferred
posting.35 Section 136 of the NIL provides that "the drawee is
allowed twenty-four hours after presentment in which to decide
whether or not he will accept the bill; but the acceptance if given
dates as of the day of presentation."8 6 If the NIL provisions
affect the application of the deferred posting statute, it could
be argued that if deferred posting were employed and the delay
exhausted, dishonor then dispatched would not be timely. The
payer bank in Louisiana would have at least twenty-four hours
after presentment to send notice of dishonor.8 7 Because of the
uncertainty which any other rule would cause, it is submitted
that any notice timely given under the deferred posting statute
should be considered timely under the NIL.
31. See Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns - The Current Check
Collection Problem, 62 HARV. L. REv. 905, 919 (1949).
32. Hibernia Nat. Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 204 La. 777, 16
So.2d 352 (1943) ; Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926) ; LaCaze v.
City Bank & Trust Co., 31 So.2d 891 (La. App. 1947).
33. 2 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1265 (1942), discusses the bank's
right of charge back in agency and owner situations.
34. LA. R.S. 7:104(1) (1950).
35. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns - The Current Check Ool-
lection Problem, 62 HABV. L. REV. 905, 921 (1949).
36. LA. R.S. 7:163 (1950).
37. This would be assuming that the rule of NIL § 136 applies to checks as
does that of § 137. The case of First Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 127 Tenn.
205, 154 S.W. 965 (1913) held that it does.
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Risks to the drawer and payee. The second class of risks
which could emanate from the practice of deferred posting are
those which shift from drawer to payee. The rule is well settled
in Louisiana that a check, in itself, does not constitute payment,
but rather payment is contingent on the eventual payment in
cash or the equivalent thereof by a bank.38 Suppose that the
payee delays for a time before presenting the check for payment.
The NIL provides that the holder must present a check "within
a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay."39 One situation which could cause difficulty here would
be that in which the dilatory payee presents a check which might
be considered late under the NIL and the bank fails during the
period of extension provided by the deferred posting statute. On
whom does the risk of loss fall? It would seem to depend upon
the time at which presentment could be said to have occurred,
and this determination could well prove troublesome.40 Appar-
ently presentment occurs under the deferred posting statute if
credit is given for the item before midnight of the day of re-
ceipt,41 and this might be either at the time the item is received
by the payer bank, or when the payer bank posts the debit to the
drawer's account, or at the time of receipt of the item by the
payer bank.42 There is obviously no ready solution to this risk
of loss problem.
There may be different considerations where the payee does
not delay in presenting the check for payment, but the bank be-
comes insolvent at some time during the posting process. If the
check can be considered "paid," risk of loss will shift from the
drawer to the payee. Personal payment may be had by merely
presenting the instrument and receiving the money,43 but if the
check is sent for credit, there are several junctures which might
be regarded as payment. The giving of credit, whether actually
charged to the drawer or not, the cancelling or cancelling and
crediting of the instrument, and the charging of the instrument
38. LA. R.S. 7:127 (1950). See, e.g., M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens'
Bank & Trust Co., 152 La. 755, 106 So. 292 (1925) ; Joffrion-Woods, Inc. v. Hi-
bernia Bank & Trust Co., 139 So. 22 (La. App. 1932).
39. LA. R.S. 7:186 (1950).
40. See LA. R.S. 7:70, 7:143 (1950) governing the details of presentment.
41. LA. R.S. 6:67 (1950).
42. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns- The Current Check Col-
lection Problem, 62 HARV. L. REv. 905, 936-40 (1949).
43. LA. R.S. 7:74 (1950).
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to the drawer's account are examples. If the check is sent for
remittance, there are several possible occurrences that might
serve as payment. These may be either the time that the remit-
tanc draft is prepared and the item is cancelled, or the time of
mailing the draft, or the time of charging the drawer's account.44
In one Louisiana case, crediting the cash book was found equiva-
lent to payment in cash. 45 Under deferred posting rules the bank
may have until midnight of the day following receipt to honor
or dishonor an item, provided that the charge was made on the
day of receipt. Therefore, it is at least possible that any charge
made might be regarded, until the expiration of the delay period,
as merely conditional, and not as final, payment, leaving the risk
with the drawer during this period.
Another risk which affects the drawer-payee situation in-
volves the question of when the drawer's interest in his de-
posited fund ceases. When it does cease the drawer loses the
power to issue stop payment orders; a creditor of the drawer
may not acquire an interest in the fund superior to that of the
payee; and a payer bank has no privilege of set-off against the
fund for a debt owed by the drawer.46 Section 119 of the NIL
provides that an instrument is discharged by payment,47 and sec-
tion 120 states that payment discharges the drawer.4 Again, the
unsettled concept of payment becomes decisive. The Louisiana
deferred posting statute, unfortunately, merely provides that
"the bank may have until midnight of its next business day after
receipt within which to honor or refuse payment of such item. ' 49
Since no risk is specifically delegated to the drawee, the risk of
loss would seem to remain on the drawer until the item can be
considered finally paid. As previously noted, however, this would
be so only if the drawee made presentment within a reasonable
time.50 The emphasis on the nebulous concept of payment has
certainly caused a quandary in this area of the law. It has been
suggested that legislatures should mark more definitely the
44. 2 PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS, opinions 1227(a) and 1228(a)
(1926).
45. Sowers Co. v. First National Bank, 6 La. App. 721 (1927).
46. See notes 20-23 supra; Sneed & Morrison, Bank Collections-A Com-
parative Study, 29 TEx. L. REV. 713 (1951) ; Morrison & Sneed, Bank Collec-
tions, The Stop Payment Transaction-A Comparative Study, 32 TEx. L. REV.
259 (1954).
47. LA. R.S. 7:119 (1950).
48. Id. 7:120.
49. Id. 6:67.
50. Id. 7:70, 7:143.
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juncture at which each of the above discussed risks shifts,5 1 and
it is submitted that the Louisiana legislature should undertake
such clarification.
Deferred Posting Under the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code adequately covers the practice
of deferred posting and delayed returns and the bankers' right
to use it. The Code incorporates the present rule that payment
over the counter is final payment. 52 In case of payment other
than that over the counter, in order to employ deferred posting
under the Code, a bank must fulfill several requirements. First,
section 4-301 (1) provides that an authorized settlement must be
made by midnight of the banking day of the receipt of the item,
except in the case where the payer bank is also the bank of
deposit.58 "Settlement" is defined as a payment "in cash, by
clearing house settlement, in a charge or credit or by remittance,
or otherwise as instructed. A settlement may be either provision-
al or final. ' 54 Settlement, as used in UCC 4-301 (1), undoubtedly
refers to conditional settlement since final settlement would con-
stitute payment. 55 The second requirement, pertaining to dis-
honor procedure, is that the payer bank must return the item, or
send notice of dishonor before its midnight deadline if the item
is not available.56 Deferred posting rules do not extend to docu-
mentary drafts,57 and are limited to demand items.58 The term
"midnight deadline" is construed to mean the close of the bank-
ing day following the day of receipt of the item or notice or from
which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever
is later.5 9 The third condition that the payer bank must fulfill
in order to use deferred posting and to revoke extended credit is
that the settlement which it makes must not amount to "final
payment. '60  This condition prevents the inconsistency of a
51. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Return -The Current Check Col-
lection Problem, 62 HARV. L. REv. 905, 952 (1949).
52. UCC 3-418, 4-301.
53. UCC 4-301(1).
54. UCO 4-104(j).
55. See UCC 4-104, comment 6; 4-213, comment 1.
56. UCC 4-301(1).
57. Ibid.
58. SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO UCC OFFICIAL DRAFT OF 1952, UCC 4-301(2) (Jan.
1955).
59. UCC 4-104(h).
60. UCC 4-301(1).
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bank's being able to revoke credit any time up to its midnight
deadline even though it may have made "final" payment. 1
Section 4-301(2) provides that in case the payer bank and
the bank of deposit are the same, it need not settle for the item
on the day of receipt. Possibly this exception is made because
the holder of the item, also being a depositor, would probably be
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regardless
of whether or not the bank had settled for the item.62
Section 4-301 (3) provides that "unless previous notice of dis-
honor has been sent an item is dishonored at the time when for
purposes of dishonor it is returned or notice sent."6 8
Section 4-301 (4) defines the time that an item is returned.
Items received through clearing houses are considered returned
when sent to the last clearing house or last collecting bank or
delivered in accordance with clearing house rules. In all other
cases return is complete when the item is sent or delivered to a
bank's customer or transferor, or handled according to his in-
structions. 64
Notwithstanding any variations above noted, the thrust of
the Code's deferred posting provision is not greatly unlike pres-
ent practice. The drafters state that the section codifies the con-
tent of the existing deferred posting statutes.6 5 It is apparently
for its treatment of relationships of the parties and the place-
ment of risks that the deposits and collections scheme of the Code
has been so strenuously opposed.66 The 1955 amendments to the
original draft of the Code would change Louisiana law by the
provision that the bank is considered the agent, rather than the
debtor, of the depositor,6 7 irrespective of the form of endorse-
61. Love, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect
the Law of Bank Deposits in Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REV. 288, 315 (1953).
62. Ibid.
63. UCC 4-301(3).
64. UCC 4-301(4).
65. UCC 4-301, comment 1.
66. Article 4, governing bank deposits and collections and including deferred
posting, has been described as "a piece of vicious class legislation." Beutel, The
Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J.
334, 357 (1952). Even a strong proponent of the Code has felt disinclined to
defend it and feels that article 4 should be deleted. Gilmore, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 379 (1952). The
article seems much like the Bank Collection Code, which Louisiana has not adopted.
See Beutel, supra, at 359.
67. UCC 4-201(1), as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO UCC OFFICIAL
DaAFT OF 1952 (Jan. 1955) ; see note 32 supra.
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ment used on the check.68 That the item was sold absolutely to
the depositary bank could be proved only if it could be estab-
lished by collateral papers or the item itself so stated.6 9 This,
together with section 4-212 of the Code, would affect present
rules governing charge-back rights of banks. Section 4-212(1)
authorizes the bank to charge back or to obtain a refund from a
customer who has been given credit when the bank learns that
it will not receive final payment. The requirement of notice of
dishonor or the return of the item need only be fulfilled within a
"reasonable time." The subsection provides that the midnight
deadline shall be a reasonable time.70 Section 4-212 (4) states that
the right of charge back is affected neither by the prior use of
the credit given for the item nor by the failure of the bank to
use ordinary care. A bank not using reasonable care may still
be liable, however, although the customer apparently must prove
lack of ordinary care.71
Section 4-213 originally defined the term "final payment" as
either payment in cash or the completion of the posting process.7 2
In 1955, however, the section was supplemented to provide that
if a bank settles for the item without reserving the right to re-
voke the settlement, and is not given such right by statute, clear-
ing house rule or agreement, this settlement also constitutes final
payment.73 The payer bank is accountable for the item and it is
considered finally paid if the bank makes final settlement.74 If
the depositary bank is also the payer of the item credit becomes
final at the time of final payment or at the midnight deadline.75
The drafters note that the concept of final payment is of utmost
importance in determining priority between items and notices,
stop orders, legal processes, and hence liability of the parties
secondarily liable.76 During the time that the item is in the hands
68. UCC 4-201(2), as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO UCC OFFICIAL
DRAFT OF 1952 (Jan. 1955), proposes that after an item has been endorsed "pay
any bank," only a bank may acquire rights of a holder except where the bank by
specific endorsement permits others to do so. One writer states that this should
protect owners from loss or theft after the items have been so endorsed and have
entered bank collection channels. Vergari, Amending the Uniform Commercial
Code- A Report on Valid Criticism and Suggested Changes- In re Articles 8,
4, and 5, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 529, 555 (1955).
69. UCC 4-201, comment.
70. UCC 4-212(1).
71. UCC 4-212(4), comments 5, 6.
72. UCC 4-213; see notes 43 and 44 supra.
73. UCC 4-213(1), as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO UCC OFFIcIAL DRAFT
OF 1952 (Jan. 1955).
74. Ibid.
75. Id. UCC 4-213(3).
7. UCC 4-213, comment 1.
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of a collecting bank "the collecting bank is not liable to prior
parties in the event of dishonor" if proper dishonor is made.'7
However, the customer seemingly must give the usual warranties
of a holder in due course78 and must engage that in the event of
dishonor he will pay the amount of the item to the transferor or
to a subsequent holder. 79 A customer may issue stop payment
orders "but the order must be received at such time and in such
manner as to afford the bank a reasonable ol~portunity to act on
it."0 For an oral stop payment order to be binding on a bank
for more than fourteen days it must be confirmed by writing
within that period.8' Only the person depositing the paper is per-
mitted to give notice affecting it and a bank is not liable to prior
parties for action taken.82
Section 4-103 provides that the effects of any provision in
article 4 may be varied by agreement of the bank with its cus-
tomers. This would seemingly permit a bank, by small-print con-
tracts on deposit slips, for instance, to make its own laws con-
cerning any aspect of bank deposits and collections. The pres-
ent Louisiana deferred posting statute likewise provides that
the parties may agree to other terms if they see fit to do so.83
Therefore, insofar as the narrow subject of deferred posting is
concerned, the provision would be no innovation in our law. Be-
cause the freedom of contract provision in the Code84 would ex-
tend to all laws regulating deposits and collections, however, it
has been suggested that the courts might hold it an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power to private interests, or pos-
sibly limit the bank's power to make agreements.8 "
Section 4-214 of the Code regulates insolvency and preference
and is similar to section 13 of the Bank Collection Code, which
was held unconstitutional, at least insofar as its application to
national banks is concerned.8 6 There is no reason to believe that
77. UCC 4-211(1).
78. UCC 4-207(1), as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO UCC OFFICiAL DRAFT
or 1952 (Jan. 1955).
79. Id. UCC 4-207(2).
80. UCC 4-403(1) ; see UCC 4-303, 4-407.
81. UCC 4-403(2), as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 To UCC OrFICIAL DRAFT
or 1952 (Jan. 1955).
82. UCC 4-203.
83. LA. R.S. 6:68 (1950).
84. UCC 4-103, as amended by SUPPLEMENT No. 1 To UCC OFFICIAL DRAFT OP
1952 (Jan. 1955).
85. Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel,
61 YALE L.J. 364, 375-76 (1952).
86. Jennings v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935).
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the defect has been removed.87 The drafters state that the pur-
pose of the section is not to confer preferential positions on
banks or anyone else, but rather to "fix as definitely as possible
the cut-off point of time for the completion or cessation of the
collection process in the case of items that happen to be in such
process at the time a particular bank suspends payments."88s
Here again the concept of when an item has been finally "paid"
becomes important. Section 4-214(2) provides that if the item
has been finally paid, the owner of the item has a preferred claim
against the payer bank. But if it is finally paid, then the drawer
would be discharged and the owner would have no claim against
him. This would run counter to the present view that the drawer
assumes responsibility for losses arising from the insolvency of
the payer bank.8 9 In most cases, however, the owner would seem-
ingly be protected by federal deposit insurance up to the amount
of $10,000, even though final settlement has not been made. The
same would be true in the event of the collecting bank's insol-
vency, provided conditional credit became final.9
Conclusion
Many other problems might arise dealing with various as-
pects of the deposits and collections article of the Code. Only
those, however, which the writer feels are most closely related
to the effect which the adoption of the Code would have on the
practice of deferred posting in Louisiana have been discussed.
Deferred posting, while adding uncertainty to the collection
process, greatly facilitates banking operations when checks and
other demand items are in such abundant use: Clarification of
the uncertainties could prove fit subject matter for legislative
revision. Whether or not this revision should be in the form of
the Uniform Commercial Code is another thing. While the adop-
tion of the Code would not change the present deferred posting
law to a great extent or affect the operations of banks there-
under, it would alter considerably the present Louisiana theory
of deposits and collections generally.
Patrick T. Caffery
87. UCC 4-214, comment 3; Beutel, The Proposed Uniform (7) Commercial
Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 359-60 (1952).
88. UCC 4-214, comment 1.
89. See Love, How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Af-
fect the Law of Bank Deposits in Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REv. 288, 305 (1953).
90. Id. at 305-06.
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